"The Doomsday Trick" Water War China India and Pakistan on The Brink

While the narrator is writing about China in Pakistan, India is using water weapons extremely strategically in occupied Kashmir, which will turn Kashmir into India's energy hub for at least the next fifty years.

Pakistan can already generate up to 10,700 MW of hydropower, while India plans to create 20,000 MW from the rivers of Occupied Kashmir alone. Since the special status of Occupied Kashmir was removed five years ago and it was granted the status of an Indian state, the practical work on these projects has increased.

These projects in Kashmir have significant strategic significance in addition to providing energy. According to India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiris will only be satisfied if the 20,000 MW of power is used in the Valley. One interpretation of Pakistan's potential resistance to these measures is that it seeks to obstruct Kashmir's prosperity.

But is the valley's industrial and domestic needs of electricity more than that of Pakistan to consume 20,000 megawatts of electricity there? If not, then why is India building these energy projects without any need, which cost too much. Of course, these projects are for the whole of India rather than the Valley.

India is permitted to construct energy projects on the rivers that flow from Kashmir to Pakistan as part of the Indus Basin initiative, but not needlessly because such projects have an impact on the river's health and each one implies another project that affects the water that flows straight to Pakistan. A canal is present.

The most regrettable aspect is that, even though just a very tiny portion of the Indus River's catchment is located in India, water from the river was allocated and included in the water budget at the time of the Indus Basin Agreement. 

The majority of the water in the Indus River originates from the rivers Karam and Kabul, which are not even in India, but rather from Gilgit-Baltistan, China. Sadly, even though the Sutlej River and the Indus bordered, the technocrats' opinions were totally disregarded at the time of the Indus Basin Agreement, and decisions were reached by using force. It was also a good idea for China to insist on signing the Indus Basin Treaty.

China intends to reroute the Indus and Sutlej rivers into the Himalayas now that it is not a part of the Indus Basin project. This might cut India's hydropower on the Sutlej by up to 30% and its water supply by up to 30%. The plans can possibly backfire. An estimate states that at least 3600 MW of India's projects might not succeed.

However, India and the past Afghan administrations have made multiple proposals to construct a dam on the Kabul River. If these plans are carried out, it may lower the water level in the Kabul River and consequently lessen the amount of water that enters the Indus River below Tarbela. Furthermore, this matter is not being handled seriously.

Along with Dasu Hydropower, the Pakistani government has also begun work on the Bhasha and Mohmand Dam projects. It's better too late, but this work ought to have been finished long ago. Pakistan must also swiftly modify its policies and implement new measures in light of the region's shifting political and environmental landscape.